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Computerized Credit Scoring's Effect
On the Lending Industry
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the era of modems and megabytes, individual con-
sumers were evaluated for credit purposes by institutional lend-
ing officers.' Basing their decisions in part on a number of set
financial criteria, these officials were often also allowed to exer-
cise wide and sometimes improper discretion as to the credit risk
of the borrower.2 In today's economy, however, many major
lending institutions have abandoned this approach. Instead, this
system has been replaced by a method in which a computer pro-
gram takes information provided by the applicant, as well as sev-
eral outside sources, and using a complex set of weighted
variables, produces a single number by which to rate the appli-
cant's credit risk.3 Due to the convenience of these systems,
banks are relying more and more on computer credit scoring
tools and the credit bureaus that often provide them.4 But what
happens when either the results they receive are inaccurate or
these results are used for inappropriate means? In these cases,
both lenders and credit bureaus may find themselves facing judi-
cial scrutiny based on federal statutes such as the Community
Reinvestment Act5 , the Equal Credit Opportunity Act6 or the Fair
1. See Alan Levinsohn, Modern Miners Plumb for Gold, A.B.A. BANKING J., Dec.,
1998, at 54.
2. See Steve Cocheo, Latest Fair-Lending Case Contains Lessons For All Banks, and
a $3 Million Bill For One, A.B.A. BANKING J., Nov., 1999, at 7.
3. See Levinsohn, supra note 1, at 54.
4. See Cheryl Jenkins Richardson, Credit Scoring of the Future, COLLECnONS &
CREDrr RIsK, April, 1999, at 19. A recent survey by the Consumer Bankers Associa-
tion showed that "94% of banks cite credit scoring as the most frequently used
method on automated loan processes." Id.
5. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
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Credit Reporting Act7, all of which seek to ensure that every con-
sumer shares the same credit opportunities.
This article will first define computer credit scoring in
comparison to previously used lending decision criteria.8 Next, a
discussion will follow regarding the possible pitfalls that may
occur when lending institutions use this powerful tool incor-
rectly, and how both the lender and consumer can be affected. 9
Finally, the article will provide possible ways that our current
system can be improved to protect both consumers and the lend-
ers who employ credit scoring systems. 10
]I. THE ADVENT OF CREDIT SCORING
Credit scoring is the use of a statistical formula that evalu-
ates a customer's finances and personal credit history and then
condenses his or her credit risk to a single number.1  Though
credit scoring gained prominence with the emergence of the
computer based model, the actual concept of credit scoring has
existed for much longer.'2 Using a set of criteria such as em-
ployment, income, age, assets, outstanding debt and history of
repayment, banks were able to manually compute a score that
could help determine the applicant's credit worthiness. 13 This
cumbersome process, however, had several problems.14 First, the
manual system required the lender to hire skilled operators to
manually calculate these scores, resulting in excessive adminis-
trative costs.15 Second, the lenders who, due to costs, chose not
to use these types of systems were forced to rely primarily upon
the business judgment of their lending officers to approve loan
7. Id. at § 1681.
8. See infra notes 11-41 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 42-170 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 171-212 and accompanying text.
11. See Sara Oppenheim, Would Credit Scoring Backfire in a Recession?, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 18,1996, at 16.






applicants.16 Thus, with the rise of the computer age, the banking
industry seemed poised to take advantage of a system that could
alleviate these problems.
Beginning in 1956, Bill Fair and Earl Isaac, two mathemati-
cians from the Stanford Research Institute, began work on a
computer model that utilized statistics and mathematics along
with consumer credit information to create numeric credit scores
more quickly and reliably than the traditional methods of the
time.17 In the early 1960's, with the progression of faster com-
puter systems, Fair, Isaac, the company they founded, introduced
a behavior scoring model that could be used to predict the credit
risk of an institution's existing customers, and within the follow-
ing two decades, laid the foundation for the types of credit scor-
ing systems that are used today.18 Although other companies
have entered the credit scoring arena, Fair, Isaac is considered the
pioneer of the technique and accounts for a majority of all con-
sumer credit scorecards used worldwide. 9
Before categorizing the types of credit scoring models that
are currently available, it is first imperative to determine the
source of information that is used within these models. Credit
scores are compiled based on both information obtained from the
consumer during the application process as well as information
acquired from credit bureaus that maintain large databases of
consumer data based on individual credit history.20 To see how
these two sources of information work together to produce one
numeric credit score, each must be examined individually.
Currently, three national credit bureaus provide lenders
with credit information that can be utilized through credit scor-
16. See Risk Based Compliance Preferable, But Tricky, AM. BANKER-BoND BUYER,
July 3, 1995, at 4. Lenders may still encounter compliance difficulties with federal
lending laws when bank officials disregard computer scores and approve or deny
loans based on their personal judgment. See id.
17. See Fair, Isaac, (visited Oct. 24,1999) <http://www.fairisaac.com>. This in-
formation was current as of Feb. 19,2000. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Levinsohn, supra note 1, at 54. Fair, Isaac and competing company Ex-
perian account for 90% of all score cards currently in use. See id.
20. See Gautam Bose and Erick Haskell, Keeping the Ones With "the Right Stuff,"
J. oFLENDING& CREDrr RISK MANAGEMENT, Apr. 1,1999, at 59, 60-61.
2000] 445
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
ing mechanisms.2' These companies collect data on consumers
from banks, mortgage lenders, credit card companies, depart-
ment stores, landlords, and credit unions, among others.22 In
essence, the credit report will reflect a consumer's bill paying his-
tory. If he or she has defaulted on credit agreements or loans,
declared bankruptcy, or has liens recorded against his property,
that information will be reflected in the report issued by the
credit bureau.2 When this information is obtained by the bank, a
particular credit scoring model can be used to place numeric val-
ues upon these past events and then compile the applicant's
credit score. In fact, if a simple unsecured transaction such as
applying for a credit card is involved, the credit bureau report
alone is often the only criteria employed by the lender in deter-
mining whether an applicant meets the bank's lending require-
ments.24
For more complex transactions like home equity loans,
auto loans, or mortgages, the lender is more likely to couple the
consumer's credit report along with personal information pro-
vided by the consumer herself.25 In these cases, information such
as job history, residential status, marital status, annual income as
well as other sources of income re typically factored into the
credit scoring system along with credit report data.26 By doing so,
the lender is presented amore accurate depiction of the bor-
rower's true financial status since they can view the applicant's
past credit history found in the credit report, as well as their cur-
rent economic stability which may reflect their ability to repay
any new loans.27
21. The three national credit bureaus are: 1) Experian, located in Allen, TX; 2)
Equifax, in Atlanta, GA; and 3) Trans Union, in Springfield, PA. See Peter
McKenna, All Debts Off, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAmY, May 14, 1999, at B1, available in
LEXIS, Bankng Library, INVDLY File.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Paul Nadler, Horror at Credit Scoring Is Not Just Foot-Dragging, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 2, 1999 at 9. Nadler had been told by several bankers that "no one
even looks at any request for $50,000 or less - the computer does it all." Id.
25. See generally Bose & Haskell, supra note 20, at 59.
26. See id.
27. See generally id. Many banks have developed statistical graphs that relate
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While lending institutions often customize their own credit
scoring systems to fit their needs, the types of models available
can generally be placed into one of three categories: 1) the predic-
tive score model, 2) the risk score model, and 3) the default scor-
ing model.28
The predictive score model is often utilized by the lender
before credit is offered and can be a valuable tool in prescreening
credit customers or targeting market segments.29 Relying heavily
on past statistical data, this model can be used to predict a cus-
tomer's ability to pay her bills based on current and past financial
information.30 For instance, by using this method, a credit card
company may use the predictive score model to create a mailing
list of consumers who based on their past financial history are
pre-approved for new accounts.
The second and most popular credit scoring model in-
volves risk scoring.31 The risk scoring model can be used to pre-
dict whether existing customers are likely to pay accounts that
have become delinquent.32 The main function of this model is to
analyze the collection potential of the account and help deter-
mine the allocation of resources that may be required to collect
on existing accounts.33 For instance, one mortgage lender using
a risk scoring model gave numeric scores from 0 to 800.34 From
the data used, the company determined that one fifth of the loans
associated with a credit score of 580 or less had reported missing
customer profitability to individual risk. On these graphs, customer profitability is
charted on one axis while risk (usually characterized by a credit score) is placed on
the other. Banks are then able to pursue customers whose data falls within the
varying quadrants. See id.
28. See Karron T. Davis, Credit Scoring Software: A Brief Look, Bus. CREDIT, Feb.
1,1999, at 32.
29. See id. The predictive score can also be used in combination with other
models, or credit departments can create their own scorecards based on the vari-
ables for which they are looking. See id.
30. See Kenneth L. Parkinson, Using Credit Screening to Manage Credit Risk, Bus.
CREDIT, March, 1998, at 22.
31. See Fair, Isaac Credit Bureau Risk Scores Mark 10 Years as Decision-Making
'Gold Standard,' PR NEWSWRE, September 7, 1999. Fair, Isaac credit scores are "the
most widely used analytical product in the world for marketing, account origina-
tion and customer management." Id.
32. See Davis, supra note 28, at 32.
33. See id.
34. See Parkinson, supra note 30, at 22.
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a payment within the previous six month period.35 In contrast,
for loans associated with scores greater than 720, the rate
dropped to 1/2 of 1 percent.36 Therefore, by utilizing the risk scor-
ing model, the lender can better separate the applicant pool be-
tween high and low risks and focus its attention in the
appropriate area.37
Finally, the default scoring model can be used to predict
whether a customer is a candidate for bankruptcy.38 These mod-
els provide ongoing customer analysis and can alert the lender to
potential "red flags" within a customer's credit history such as
histories of late payments or past bankruptcies. 39 If used prop-
erly, this model can alert the creditor of the potential risk of
bankruptcy with sufficient lead time for the lender to take ap-
propriate actions to reduce any potential losses.40 Though credit
scoring companies are quick to point out that these scores are not
completely accurate, they argue these systems are crucial in help-
ing businesses worldwide maximize the value of customer data
and make profitable business decisions based on that informa-
tion.41
IIL. CREDIT SCORING FROM THiE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
A. Advantages
Undeniably, computer credit scoring has changed the way
financial lending institutions evaluate loan applicants.42 There
are several distinct reasons why these money lenders have fore-
gone traditional evaluation methods and have opted instead for a




38. See Davis, supra note 28, at 32.
39. See Parkinson, supra note 30, at 22.
40. See id.
41. See Fair, Isaac, supra note 17. This information was current as of Feb. 19,
2000. See id.
42. See Richardson, supra note 4, at 19.
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ficult choices. First, many lenders praise credit scoring systems
for the savings they provide in transaction costs.43 Rather than a
loan officer evaluating an individual or small business applicant,
credit scoring provides a computerized formula that analyzes the
applicant's finances and personal credit history.44 In doing so,
the applicant's credit risk is reduced to a single number upon
which the officer may make her credit decision.45
While transaction cost savings are indeed considerable,
there are other economic advantages in using an automated scor-
ing system. By using a carefully constructed scoring model, the
accuracy of the lender's evaluation decision increases substan-
tially.46 Rather than relying on the personal intuition of the loan
officer, lending institutions contend they have the ability to ac-
cept more applications from passing applicants because they are
able to "weed out" applications from those more likely to de-
fault.47 In addition to assisting with new accounts, credit scores
can also be used to service existing accounts as well.48 For in-
stance, applicants whose credit scores were just above the pass-
ing threshold may only have qualified for a minimum amount
while those with higher scores are usually given more latitude.49
In the future, however, if the low scoring applicant is able to
show an improved financial status, he may then be able to rely on
an improved credit score to obtain more funds from the lender.
5 0
43. See Oppenheim, supra note 11.
44. See id. By using a computer based scoring system, the average processing
time for a loan application can be reduced from 12 hours to as little as 25 minutes.
See id. A new lending machine has also been proposed that would utilize a credit
scoring mechanism. By using this machine as opposed to a traditional lending offi-
cer, the cost of making the average loan would be decreased from $136 to only $38.
See Lisa Troshinsky, Loan Machine Is Lauded as CRA Tool, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER,
Oct. 23,1995, at 1.
45. See Warren L. Dennis, Fair Lending and Credit Scoring, MORTGAGE BANKING,
Nov. 1995 at 55, 56-57. The use of credit scoring in regard to mortgage lending is a
very recent phenomenon facilitated by the increasing use of computerized process-
ing of loan applications. See id. at 55.
46. See id. at 56.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 58.
50. See id.
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Advocates of scoring systems contend that perhaps the
most beneficial result to the lender is the system's ability to help
ensure compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA).51 Under a computer based system, proponents allege
the human element in credit evaluation is replaced by a nondis-
criminatory system that is objectively blind to racial and lifestyle
factors.52 Rather than appraising these types of subjective crite-
ria, the system simply counts the number of positive points from
the consumer's application and weighs them against the nega-
tives based on a number of objective credit factors that are linked
to similar past occurrences.5 3 Since elements such as race are re-
moved from these calculations, proponents of computer scoring
contend that lenders can avoid charges of discrimination by sim-
ply showing the absence of virtually any opportunity for subjec-
tive criteria to enter the lender's decision54
B. Disadvantages
Although the above mentioned factors have weighed heav-
fly in the decisions of many lenders in considering the viability of
computer credit scoring systems, some within the banking sector
have been far more critical.55 In fact, the industry has addressed
several problems encountered when using computer based sys-
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1994). The statute declares:
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any ap-
plicant, with respect to any credit transaction on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status or age (pro-
vided the applicant has the capacity to contract; (2) because all or
part of the applicant's income derives from any public assistance
program; or (3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised
any right under this chapter.
Id.
52. See Warren L. Dennis, Fair Lending and Credit Scoring, MORTGAGE BANKING,
Nov. 1995 at 55, 56.
53. See id. at 56-57.
54. See id.
55. See Elizabeth D. Festa, Credit Scoring Embraced With Joy and Caution, AM.
BANKER-BOND BUYER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 6. While lenders are becoming less fearful of




tems that could affect future use of such systems. These include:
1) the argument that computer scoring systems which appear
neutral on their face may actually have a disproportionately ad-
verse effect on the classes sought to be protected;56 2) the ten-
dency of some lenders to override poor computer scores and
issue loans to those whose qualifications would be questionable
under the computer based system;5 7 3) the belief by many com-
munity activists that banks using computer credit scoring are in-
capable of complying with the fair lending legislation like the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)58; 4) the fact that computer
based systems rely upon the past ability of the consumer to pay
rather than the consumer's current financial status; 59 and 5) the
information they receive from credit bureaus may not always be
correct, thus resulting in inaccurate credit scores.
60
As mentioned, computer credit scoring relies on the use of
numerous variables that are used to determine the applicant's
credit score.61 On the surface, these variables may appear objec-
tive, but in reality they may still reflect racial bias.62 For example,
a credit-scoring system may place a low score on occupations
such as migratory work or low paying service jobs. While this
action alone may have no discriminatory intent, if a majority of
these workers in the geographic area are racial minorities, this job
classification can have an unfair effect upon that consumer's loan
56. See Safeguard Scores From Disparate Impact Qualities, CREDrr RiSK MANAGE-
MENT REP., June 3,1996, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, BIS File.
57. See Steve Cocheo, 14 Tips for Avoiding Compliance Trouble, A.B.A. BANKING
J., Sept. 1998, at 38. Robert Chamness, chief operating officer of CFI ProServices, Inc.
notes that in regard to the overriding of a computer credit score: "One person's
'intuition' could be another person's 'discrimination'." Id.
58. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (1994). "(1) Regulated financial institutions are re-
quired by law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and
needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business." Id.
59. See Oppenheim, supra note 11. A "credit score assessment is only as good
as the data it's based on and the underlying assumptions about which statistics best
predict a borrower's ability to repay a loan." Id.
60. See Edmund Mierzwinski, Nightmare on Credit Street, CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION REP., Feb, 1994 at 1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, AGCONS File.
61. See Oppenheim, supra note 11.
62. See Warren L. Dennis, Fair Lending and Credit Scoring, MORTGAGE BANKING,
Nov. 1995, at 57.
2000]
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application decision.63 Based on the legislative history of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Congress has articulated an intol-
erance for not only blatant discrimination in consumer lending
practices, but also acts which produce these same effects.64 Thus,
in these cases, the lender who has relied on the computer credit
scoring model to ensure compliance with government lending
laws, may be forced to defend the very criteria used to sort
through the applicant pool.65
Another problem area in connection with ECOA compli-
ance has involved lenders overriding computer credit scores. 66
When scores are clearly above or below the benchmark set by the
lender, approval or disapproval of the loan takes relatively no
human judgment at all.67 The problem, however, lies with those
applicants whose scores fall on or very near this cutoff line.68 In
these situations, the opportunity for racial discrimination is once
again possible. In fact, in September, 1999, Washington-Deposit
Guaranty National Bank, one of the largest banks in Mississippi
agreed to pay $3 million to African-Americans who had been de-
nied loans based on discriminatory lending practices.69 In this
case, loan officers had been given wide discretion to override
credit scores and approve loans that would have otherwise been
denied.70 During a three year period from 1995 until the end of
1997, this practice resulted in a denial rate of 32% for African-
63. See id.
64. See id. The rule generally applied to in these situations is that a factor that
is "facially neutral" can be prohibited if used in a credit-granting system and it can
be shown statistically to have a "disparate impact" on a prohibited basis. See id.
65. See Safeguard Scores From Disparate Impact Qualities, supra note 56. Several
ways that banks can protect themselves from disparate impact suits include: 1)
making sure that all credit criteria used in the scoring system have a legitimate
business purpose; 2) evaluating multiple borrower strengths and weaknesses to
show a thorough analysis has been made; and 3) improving service during the loan
process since a lack of response to consumer requests can be interpreted as an un-
fair lending practices. See id.
66. See Cocheo, supra note 57, at 33.
67. See id. at 38.
68. See Jesse Snyder, Misuse May Be Hazardous, CREDIT CARD MANAGEMENT,
Sept. 1997, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, BIS File.




American applicants seeking home improvement loans, while the
comparable denial rate for similar white applicants was only
8.9%.7 In its case against the bank, the Department of Justice
found the criteria used in approval decisions had been both "in-
consistently applied" and "poorly documented," and were the
direct result of lack of supervision from a central office. 72 While
Deposit Guaranty denied it had violated fair-lending laws
through discrimination, its situation serves as a prime example of
how lenders who use credit scoring systems should limit the
number of overrides they issue. Additionally, lenders should
implement a system where any overrides by individual lending
officers are examined by a higher ranking official.73
Another reason a lender may wish to limit the number of
overrides it allows is a purely financial one. As stated, most
banks feel that a certain number of overrides are necessary to in-
crease the lender's consumer base.74 However, while some over-
ride gambles might pay off by earning the bank new
creditworthy customers, statistics show that overrides of low
scores generally perform poorly compared to those approved
based on acceptable scores.75 In fact, one scoring consultant for a
major credit bureau found that overrides were typically three to
four times more likely to result in a loss than score approvals. 76
Thus, lenders may be faced with the difficult choice of denying
all those who do not meet objective credit scoring criteria and los-
ing some potentially good customers, or allowing score overrides
and the possible risks that may result.77
Though overrides of credit scores can pose a potential
problem for credit score users, other problems can be much more
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Cocheo, supra note 2, at 7.
74. See Snyder, supra note 68.
75. See id.
76. See id (citing Carol H. Dietrichs, a scoring consultant for Experian Strategic
Solutions in Atlanta).
77. See Lisa Troshinsky, CRA is No Shield: NationsBank Lawsuit Opens 'Model'
Banks to Attack, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER, Oct. 2,1995, at 1. Even banks with pris-
tine CRA compliance records can find themselves facing discrimination suits. See
id.
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serious. Primarily, those choosing to utilize computer credit scor-
ing must ensure they are in strict compliance with the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act (CRA).78 Under this legislation, lenders
are required to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the
convenience and needs (both for credit and deposit services) of
their local communities including its low to moderate income
consumers.79 By using computer credit scoring, however, some
activists have argued that banks will simply be unable to meet
CRA requirements since many of those low to moderate income
customers are those who will fail most credit scoring tests.80 For
example, a group of African American Washington, D.C. resi-
dents brought suit against NationsBank in 1995 claiming that the
bank would not allow them to explain away blemishes on their
credit record or include part time job salaries when calculating
their income to be used for a credit score.8l According to the
plaintiffs, the lender did not comply with the CRA when it chose
to accept a credit score as conclusive proof of his or her financial
situation rather than the plaintiff's statements.8 2 Thus, a bank
which had been noted for its past compliance with the CRA still
found itself vulnerable to suit.83
Next, skeptics argue that computer based credit scoring is
simply not as reliable as many believe.84 These critics are quick
to point out that computer credit scores are based on past occur-
rences and may not adequately reflect the current financial situa-
tion of the applicant.85 For instance, in AT&T Universal Card
78. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994).
79. See Jo Ann S. Barefoot, When High-Tech Banking Meets Paper-Based Regs.
A.B.A. BANKING J., Mar. 1996, at 34.
80. See Safeguard Scores From Disparate Impact Qualities, supra note 56. Advo-
cacy groups have voiced concern that components of scoring systems are neutral on
their face, but can still discriminate against minority groups. Assistant Secretary of
the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Roberta Achtenberg stated:
"Disparate treatment operates to disproportionately disadvantage persons because
of race, color, national origin, religion, handicap, sex or familial status." Id.
81. See Troshinsky, supra note 77, at 1.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Mierzwinski, supra note 60.
85. See Oppenheim, supra note 11.
454 [Vol. 4
TECHNOLOGY
Services v. Mercer,86 the court failed to allow the lender to recover
a substantial debt after the plaintiff had declared bankruptcy. In
doing so, the court noted that the borrower had amassed a
$35,000 gambling debt in the two years prior to the issuing of her
pre-approved credit card.87 This preapproval had been based
upon a pre-screening process undertaken by the lender after the
consumer was required to provide only her reported income, so-
cial security number, date of birth, and home and business ad-
dresses.88 In admonishing the defendant for not requesting more
information from the applicant, the court stated that "offering
this customer a pre-approved card, without making any individ-
ual inquiry into her financial status, is the equivalent of buying a
horse with one eye." 89 Though a bankruptcy specialist employed
by the defendant testified as to the thoroughness of defendant's
pre-screening process, examples like this clearly show that com-
puter credit-scoring has not and will never be a perfect tool to
evaluate low risk loan candidates. 90
Finally, a major problem for those using credit scoring in-
volves the conduct of the very credit bureaus from whom they
obtain so much of their information. When lenders use consumer
information gleaned from credit reports, the general assumption
is that the data is both accurate and complete. When this as-
sumption fails, however, lenders may find themselves turning
away potential customers who would have been approved had
their credit reports been properly maintained. 91 In fact, this reali-
zation of the growing power of credit bureaus to affect consum-
ers prompted Congress to pass the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) in 1968 as a means of requiring "that consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the con-
86. 220 B.R. 315 (Bankr. S.D.Miss. 1998).
87. See id. at 321.
88. See id. at 319-320.
89. See id. at 325.
90. See id.
91. See Mierzwinski, supra note 60, at 1.
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sumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy relevancy,
and proper utilization of such information."92 The problem,
however, lies in the fact that all three national credit bureaus
have continuously failed to ensure their data is mistake free.9 3
For example, in 1991, TRW, a credit reporting company, wrongly
characterized every taxpayer in a small Vermont town as a poor
credit risk by enclosing false public record information into their
reports. 94 A year later, in a separate case, Equifax was forced to
settle with the citizens of Middlesex County, Massachusetts for
virtually the same offense.95 Although the major credit bureaus
now insist their record keeping methods have dramatically im-
proved, lenders must still be aware that the credit score they may
rely on to approve or deny a customer may not always be reli-
able.96
IV. CONSUMERS AND COMPUTER CREDIT SCORING
A. Advantages
Just as lenders have found benefits in the use of computer
scoring techniques, consumers have profited as well. By focusing
on objective credit scoring criteria, some consumer advocates feel
that lending institutions have been less able to reject otherwise
qualified consumers based on personal whim or subjective
measures.97 In fact, acts like the ECOA have served as a valuable
means for the disgruntled consumer to challenge the lending de-
cisions of financial institutions when their credit scores would
otherwise afford them a loan.98 For instance, in Davidson v. Citi-
corp/Citibank,99 the defendant bank had been granted summary
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994).




97. See Dennis, supra note 62, at 56.
98. See id. at 57.




judgment by the trial court when the plaintiff, an African Ameri-
can, failed to state a claim under the ECOA.10 0 Upon amendment
of the complaint, however, the plaintiff alleged the bank had
been loaning money to white applicants whose credit scores were
equal or inferior to those of the plaintiff.1°1 By including this fact,
the court felt plaintiff's complaint could now be brought under
the act.10
2
In Johnson v. Kakvand,103 the plaintiff attempted to refinance
a thirty year mortgage through the defendant. Though having an
above average credit rating, she was denied a loan based on rea-
sons the court found clearly dubious.1 4  By introducing her
credit history as evidence, the court found a distinct violation of
the ECOA and required the lender to take considerable steps to
ensure future compliance. 05 Thus, as these examples illustrate,
credit scoring can not only serve as a useful tool to the lender, but
the criteria used in scoring models can help establish a cause of
action for the plaintiff if lenders choose to deny their services for
non-economic reasons.
B. Disadvantages: Privacy Concerns in Modern Lending Practices
Until now, the focus has been on the conception of the
computer credit scoring system, why businesses may or may not
use them, and the advantages they might serve to the average




103.192 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. Sept. 1999).
104. See id. While completing the initial application, the plaintiff had informed
the defendant of a second floor kitchen that had been installed before she pur-
chased the home. Two weeks later, the defendant rejected the plaintiffs application
claiming the kitchen made the property unacceptable for refinancing purposes. See
id. at 658.
105. See id. Having found to have violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
the defendant was required to: adopt a uniform loan application and develop, insti-
tute and apply a uniform procedure for handling loan inquires which shall include
uniform criteria relating to the income, credit, credit history, family size and other
relevant criteria for loan applicants. See id. at 659.
106. See supra notes 1-105 and accompanying text.
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plete, however, without an examination of the problems that con-
tinue to plague borrowers who are forced to deal with lenders
and credit bureaus who they feel may only see them as a numeric
credit score. The first of these concerns deals with a consumer's
privacy rights regarding their credit scoring information.10 7 With
the inception of the FCRA, Congress recognized the need for an
accurate yet equitable system in which lenders could assess the
creditworthiness of applicants.10 8 It also recognized, however,
the type of information kept by these institutions should be con-
sidered private and released only under specific circumstances. 10 9
Therefore, Congress included language within the statute that
required consumer reporting agencies to show "respect for the
consumer's right to privacy."" 0 Although this language was an
important part of the act when passed, in today's information age
even more emphasis is justifiably being placed on how data is
being gathered and how it can be used in other contexts."'
In fact, some lenders have been undeterred in grasping the
opportunity to take personal information used in computing
credit scores and use that information for improper gain." 2 This
potential for misuse was perhaps best stated by a bank employee
107. See Jo Ann S. Barefoot, The Next Compliance Controversy: PRIVACY, A.B.A.
BANKING J., Jan. 1997, at 22.
108.15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) states:
"(1) The banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate
credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the effi-
ciency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods
undermine the public confidence which is essential to the contin-
ued functioning of the banking system.(2) An elaborate mechanism
has been developed for investigating and evaluating the credit wor-
thiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, and general
reputation of consumers. Consumer reporting agencies have as-
sumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit
and other information on consumers. There is a need to insure that
consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities
with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's rights
to privacy.
Id.
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (describing in explicit detail when a credit bureau
may release a consumer's credit report).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
111. See Barefoot, supra note 107, at 22.
112. See id. at 24.
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who described the ability banks now have to probe the private
lives of its customers:
We have all these bits of paper passing through our
hands each day containing information about our
customers. We used to think our business was just
to take information off the bits of paper to make
transaction entries in the customers' accounts.
Now, we see the real value is in the information that
is on the bits of paper -data about what the cus-
tomer likes to buy, and how much they spend, what
their interests are, what their needs are, what their
tastes are, how their lives may be changing. Know-
ing this about them gives us the ability to sell all
kinds of things to them, that we otherwise would
not be able to do." 3
Thus, it certainly comes as no surprise that some banks
are no longer content with maintaining various databases that
are used only to touch the tip of the consumer information ice-
berg. Instead, new-age bankers envision one enormous database
that may contain data regarding deposits, savings, loans, credit
cards, brokerage, insurance, annuities, securities underwriting
and more.11 4 In fact, to manipulate these complex databases, the
lending industry has even begun recruiting from such fields as
economics, psychology, and sociology in hopes of taking full ad-
vantage of this new found resource. 15
In their defense, bank officials are quick to point to the
long term benefits of using these types of systems to avoid the
cost of subsidizing high-risk borrowers, and also contend that the
more varied information they obtain about the consumer, the
more accurate judgments they can make." 6 For instance, online
113. See id.
114. See Alan Levinsohn, supra note 1, at 52.
115. See id.
116. See Joe Asher, Look what credit scoring can do now; Loan analysis, behavior pre-
diction, fair lending enhancement, and more. Banks start to apply it to mortgages and small
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book purchases, gifts paid for by credit card, or credit charges at
your favorite restaurant can all be acquired and plugged into
credit scoring systems as factors that predict the behavior of the
potential borrower.11 7 In fact, one business academic has gone as
far as saying that in today's unsteady credit market, banks would
be "positively negligent" if they did not use all the information at
their disposal." 8 He then gave the following scenario as illustra-
tion:
Two individuals both apply for loans and every-
thing about them is the same except one person
goes to Las Vegas once month and the other never
seems to gamble. You know the one who goes to
Las Vegas is going to be more of a risk. [Or] Some-
one who has a bunch of $100 charges to Jane's
House of Pleasure or a person who buys nitroglyc-
erin at a pharmacy for a heart condition may or may
not be more of a risk." 9
Unconvinced as to the legitimacy of this use of personal
information, consumer advocacy groups have raised three dis-
tinct issues they feel must be addressed regarding privacy and
the circulation of consumer information to be used in credit de-
termination. 20
These issues are: 1) the infringement on personal liberties
that may result from the use of personal information for credit
scoring purposes; 2) the misappropriation of this type of informa-
tion; and 3) the wrongful dispersion and use of this informa-
tion.121 To understand the privacy plight of the consumer, each
must be addressed separately.
loans, A.B.A. BANKING J., May, 1994, at 51.
117. See generally Barefoot, supra note 107, at 22. Barefoot describes an e-mail
she received warning that for a small fee, anyone could acquire data about her that
ranged from her driver's license to the amount paid for her home. See id.
118. See Levinsohn, supra note 1, at 55 (quoting Lewis Manell, the Dean of the






As mentioned earlier, technological advances like the
Internet, e-commerce, and especially the use of credit cards have
essentially provided a window for viewing how we live.122 Thus,
as consumers become more and more afraid that "big brother" is
watching, the inevitable result has been the petitions of legisla-
tures for more stringent laws controlling how this type of infor-
mation may be used.123 In fact, Congress has been quite
responsive in addressing the privacy issue.124 For instance, the
end of the 105 h Congress saw a total of 250 privacy bills that
were pending, many of which regarded electronic commerce is-
sues.125 Senate Banking Committee Chairman, Phil Gramm, even
conducted a full committee hearing regarding financial privacy
issues on June 9, 1999 stating that "the current laws covering
banking and securities were written before the Internet became a
part of daily life and before the explosion in new technology."126
In fact, this need for more modem legislation addressing our new
economy culminated in the passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act on November 4, 1999.127 Set to go into effect on March 12,
2000, the act contains several provisions designed to protect con-
sumer financial information from improper use.128 Under this
plan, all financial institutions are required to disclose their pri-
vacy policy regarding the sharing of non-public personal infor-
mation with third parties. 129
Consumers also have the option to "opt out" of sharing
non-public personal information with nonaffiliated third parties
122. See Michael Tarsala and Nick Turner, Lawmakers Aim to Make Secrets Safe in
Cyberspace, INVFSOR'S Bus. DAILY, May 10, 1999 at A6, available in LEXIS, Bankng
Library, INVDLY File. (stating that "privacy has emerged as the number one issue
for Internet users").
123. See id.
124. See Michelle Clayton, Your Bank May Have a Privacy Problem, AMERICA's
CoMMuNrry BANKER, Jan. 1, 1999, at 18.
125. See id.
126. Steve Cocheo, Privacy Stays on D.C.'s Burner, A.B.A. BANKING J., June,
1999, at 7.
127. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. Law No. 106-102, 1999
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as well. Finally, the Federal Trade Commission is given the au-
thority to enforce the Act by administering civil penalties for any
violation. 30 Thus, by enacting this legislation, Congress has rec-
ognized that the convenience and ease in which consumer finan-
cial information can be freely exchanged must be tempered by
laws that prohibit its unauthorized use.'3' In fact, since a con-
sumer's credit information is some of the most important per-
sonal data available, both lenders and credit bureaus who
employ credit scoring means will inevitably be required to ad-
dress the privacy issue and ensure that their dealings with third
parties are in compliance with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
32
While the problem of private companies selling consumer
information is compelling, perhaps the more egregious practice
occurs when lenders take advantage of their custodial position of
consumer credit information by directly selling customer data to
third parties. 33 For instance, in June of 1999 a state action was
brought in Minnesota accusing U.S. Bancorp of selling customer
information to a third party telemarketing company for
$4,000,000 and 22% of the company's sales.134 This third party
company then allegedly used this information to solicit the sale
of health club memberships. 3 Although U.S. Bancorp initially
denied the charges, the consumer backlash that resulted from
news of the allegations prompted the company to settle the suit
only weeks later. 36 In doing so, the company agreed to pay an
amount equal to that received from the telemarketing firm to the
130. See id.
131. See Capital Briefs: Bipartisan Group to Push for Consumer Privacy, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 11, 2000, at 2. Alabama Senator Richard Shelby (R) has openly ex-
pressed the view that the privacy provisions in Gramm-Leach-Bliley are not tough
enough and is seeking to enact even tougher privacy laws this year. See id.
132. See L. Richard Fischer & Clarke Dryden Camper, Enforcement of Reform's
Privacy Rules, AM. BANKER, Dec. 10, 1999, at 9. Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, en-
forcement of the privacy provisions is divided between the Federal Reserve Board,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and state regulators. See id.
133. See U.S. Bancorp Privacy Snafit May Doom H.R.10, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER,
June 14,1999, at 1.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Minnesota Attornmey General and U.S. Bancorp Settle Customer Privacy Suit,
PR NEwswIRE, June, 30,1999, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, PRNEWS File.
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state as well as to provide its customers with an opt-out option
that would not allow the bank to release information to commer-
cial parties unless the individual consented. 37
V. CONSUMER V. CREDIT BUREAU:
WHEN THE CREDIT BUREAU PREVAILS
Based on the incidents addressed, consumer concern as to
how credit scoring information is obtained and used is clearly
well founded. Although the Gramm Act has helped inhibit
commercial entities from engaging in suspect use of consumer
financial information, focus should now rest on how our fair
lending legislation is addressing problems regarding how credit
scoring information is maintained, and how consumers can en-
sure their credit score is kept both accurate and private.
Perhaps the biggest problem for credit agencies in terms of
compliance with the FCRA has been when these organizations
are accused of releasing consumer credit information to those
who are not authorized to obtain it.' 38 In fact, many FCRA cases
involve either private individuals suing others for improperly
obtaining their credit information or suits against the credit bu-
reaus themselves for negligence in releasing this data to the
wrong person.139
In Wilson v. Sessoms, Equifax,140 a private insurance investi-
gator improperly obtained a copy of the plaintiff's credit infor-
mation from a local subsidiary of Equifax in violation of the
FCRA.141 The question faced by the court, however, was whether
in allowing the investigator to obtain this credit information, the
credit bureau had impinged upon the FCRA requirement that
credit bureaus maintain appropriate procedures to ensure that
137. See id.
138. See U.S. Bancorp Privacy Snafu May Doom H.R.IO, supra note 133, at 1.
139. See Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F. 2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1022 (1987) (holding that a plaintiff who proves damages under the FCRA is
entitled to actual damages as well as reasonable attorney's fees as provided under
15 U.S.C. § 1681(o)).
140. No. 4:96 CV01031,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8154, (M.D. N.C. Mar. 1998).
141. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (1994)).
2000] 463
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
reports are furnished to third parties only for permissible pur-
poses.142 The court held that "the standard of conduct for deter-
mining whether the consumer reporting agency maintained
reasonable procedures is what a reasonably prudent person
would do under the circumstances."143 Thus, under this stan-
dard, the credit bureau simply had to prove that neither it nor its
subsidiary had any reason to believe that the insurance agent
would obtain the plaintiff's credit report for an improper pur-
pose.'" Since the agent had earlier certified that he would request
consumer credit information only for permissible purposes, and
this had been his first offense in this regard, the court granted
summary judgment for both credit bureaus.145
In the somewhat analogous case of Andrews v. Trans Union
Corp.,146 a consumer brought suit against the credit bureau under
the FCRA for providing credit reports for an impostor who had
stolen the plaintiff's name, driver's license and social security
numbers, and attempted to obtain credit using them.147 Under the
plaintiff's theory, the credit bureau's dissemination of her credit
information had not been reasonable, since her report had been
disclosed in response to her impostor's applications for credit.148
In refuting plaintiff's argument, the court held that even though
the consumer's information was being obtained without her
permission, the impostor's creditor indeed had a "legitimate
business need" for the credit report of the person being imper-
sonated.149 Thus, the court found no FCRA violation, and
granted summary judgment for the credit bureau on this count.150
Although the habit of credit bureaus giving sensitive credit
information to improper parties is noteworthy, perhaps some of
the most serious violations by credit bureaus involve their failure
142. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3) (1994)).
143. Id. (citing Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (1987)).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (C.D.Cal. 1998).
147. See id. at 1063.
148. See id. at 1065.
149. See id. at 1061 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681(e)(a) (1994)).
150. See id. at 1084 (citing 15 U.S.C. §1681b(3)(e) (1994)).
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to correct inaccurate information within consumer credit reports
after these mistakes have been brought to their attention.'5' As
mentioned earlier, banks are often placed in a precarious position
when they use inaccurate data provided by credit bureaus. 5 2
However, it is the consumer who is often forced to bare the brunt
of these inaccuracies during their daily lives. 5 3 As stated, the
FCRA requires credit bureaus to adopt reasonable procedures to
ensure the information they maintain within their computer da-
tabases is accurate.'- 4 As the following case illustrates, the
threshold set forth by the courts as to what constitutes a reason-
able effort can be quite low, and the consumer is faced with the
daunting task of proving willful or negligent misconduct on the
part of the credit bureau.
In Renninger v. Chexsystems & Equifax Credit Information Ser-
vices, Inc.,155 the plaintiff brought suit against the credit bureau
for failing to correct its records that listed her as having died in
1992.156 During the period from 1992 until 1997, plaintiff applied
for credit on at least seven different occasions and was turned
down due to the defendant's failure to correct its mistake. 57 Af-
ter each occasion, the plaintiff contacted the credit bureaus offer-
ing to provide proof that she indeed was alive. 58 Unable to
resolve the problem, she brought suit in early 1997 claiming the
credit bureaus had willfully or negligently failed to correct their
mistake. 5 9 In response, the defendant claimed that no "credit
report" as defined by the FCRA had been issued regarding the
plaintiff, and that her previous requests for her report constituted
151. See Mierzwinski, supra note 60.
152. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
153. See Mierzwinski, supra note 60, at 1.
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994).
155.1998 WL 295497 (N.D.III. 1998).
156. See id. This information had been obtained from the Social Security Ad-
ministration in 1992. Upon receiving notice of the error in 1992, the SSA had im-
mediately corrected the mistake. See id. at *1.
157. See id. Although the mistake had been present in plaintiff's credit reports
from all three major credit bureaus, both Trans Union and Experian had corrected
the problem after the first request. See id.
158. See id. at*1.
159. See id. at *2-3.
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a "credit disclosure" not subject to liability.160 In finding for the
credit bureau, the court concluded that no "credit report" had
been issued by the bureau within the applicable statute of limita-
tions, and that the plaintiff had suffered no damage due to the
inaccuracies within her file.161 Though the court expressed its
sympathies for the plaintiff's plight, it felt compelled to honor the
law as it had been written and deny recovery.162
VI. CONSUMER V. CREDIT BUREAU: WHEN THE CONSUMER PREVAILS
Does legislation like the Fair Credit Reporting Act still pro-
tect the consumer in today's electronic age? Based on these ex-
amples, one may be inclined to answer no. After all, if a woman
who repeatedly seeks for five years to have her credit report
show she is alive and not dead cannot recover as the statue is
currently written, it would appear that most consumer actions
would fail. However, one area where the courts do seem to give
deference to the plaintiff occurs when a third party interprets the
general language of the FCRA too liberally and construes the act
as allowing them access to another's credit file.
In Duncan v. Handmaker,'63 the plaintiffs, who had earlier
brought suit against their mortgage company for failing to in-
spect the property's water supply before sale, brought suit
against the lender's attorney for improperly obtaining a copy of
the plaintiff's credit report.164 In preparing for the deposition of
the plaintiffs in the real estate case, the attorney had obtained
their credit report through his firm's association with Equifax.165
In defending this acquisition, the defendant claimed his firm had
160. See id. at *4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681(g)(a)).
161. See id. Since plaintiff's earlier requests for credit had not occurred within
2 years of the time of suit (as required under the FCRA), plaintiff relied upon a let-
ter from the credit bureau seeking more information from the SSA to constitute a
"consumer report" under the statute. The court, however, declined to accept the
letter as a report and dismissed the case. See id. at *6.
162. See id.
163.149 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 1998).
164. See id. at 426.
165. See id. at 426.
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a legitimate business interest in obtaining the credit report of the
plaintiff as required by the FCRA, and this need was connected
with the lending transaction between the plaintiff and the
lender.166 In refuting this contention, the court stated: "basic
principles of statutory construction prevent us from interpreting
§ 1681b(3)(E) in a fashion that allows a party to obtain a con-
sumer [credit] report for a purpose only tangentially related to
the extension of credit. If we interpret § 1681b(3)(E) too
broadly...we would inadvertently transform it into a provision
that enabled information-seekers to circumvent the restrictions of
the FCRA."167 Thus, the court appears ready and willing to ad-
monish those select few who take advantage of the ease of access
modem technology provides to acquire data that should not be
available to them.
Another improper use of credit reports occurs when the
documents have been used in employment hiring decisions
without the prospective employee's knowledge. In Mathews v.
Government Employees. Ins. Co., 168 800 individuals, who had ap-
plied to GEICO for employment and had been denied, filed suit
after being informed this decision had been based in part on the
use and evaluation of their consumer credit reports. Although
the company admitted this action may have been an FCRA viola-
tion, it argued that the plaintiff had failed to meet the high stan-
dard for willful conduct that is usually required by the court in
FCRA cases. 69 The court, however, noted that willful conduct
could be demonstrated by a reckless disregard for the company's
responsibilities under the FCRA, and that its conduct in this
situation clearly qualified as such. 70 Thus, the court again ex-
pressed that while the statutory language used in the FCRA was
not completely rigid, it did not allow third parties to exploit the
166. See id.
167. See id. at 427.
168. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D.Cal. 1998).
169. See id. at 1165. See also Casella v. Equifax Credit Information Services, 56 F. 3d
469, 476 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding there is no violation of the FCRA when a credit
bureau refuses to delete allegedly false information in a credit report when the
agency has reason to believe it is accurate).
170. See id. at 1164.
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necessary latitude provided to ensure a fair system for all parties.
VII. LENDERS, CONSUMERS, AND CREDIT BUREAUS:
How ALL PARTIES CAN WIN
Many of the problems in the computerized systems used
today can be traced not to the integrity of the systems them-
selves, but instead to their maintenance. 171 As mentioned, credit
bureaus are the primary source of credit scoring information.172
Having recognized the importance of these entities in the com-
mercial industry, Congress, when drafting the FCRA, showed an
initial deference to credit bureaus that has resulted in a myriad of
inefficiency and abuse.173 Therefore, any reformation of the cur-
rent system where creditworthiness is determined through an
automated process must begin by examining how these bureaus
are currently regulated and how the system could be improved.
One prominent requirement imposed by the FCRA states
that "whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a con-
sumer report, it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure
o maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the
individual about whom the report relates." 174 As might be ex-
pected, the courts have generally found the accuracy of a report
to be a complete defense to any action brought under this provi-
sion.175 The problem, however, often lies in determining what
constitutes accuracy under the act.176 Several cases have held that
171. See Mierzwinski, supra note 60, at 1. The complaints against credit bureaus
had achieved such notoriety that they had been deemed "Public Enemy #1 at the
FTC". Id.
172. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
173. See Austin v Bankamerica Service Corp., 419 F. Supp. 730 (N.D.Ga. 1974).
The FCRA does not impose strict liability for incompleteness in a report. In the
case, a credit report which correctly stated that a credit applicant was named as a
defendant in a lawsuit failed to mention that his involvement was only in his offi-
cial capacity as a deputy county marshal. Here the court held the report to be accu-
rate under the language of the FCRA. See id.
174.15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1994).
175. See McPhee v. Chilton Corp., 468 F. Supp. 494 (D.Conn. 1978). See also,
Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co. 416 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D.Ga. 1976).
176 See Booth v. TRW Credit Data, 768 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (distin-
guishing between accuracy and completeness in a credit report).
468 [Vol. 4
TECHNOLOGY
an omission from a credit report does not render the report inac-
curate under the FCRA. For example, in McPhee v. Chilton
Corp.,177 the credit report of a husband and wife had truthfully
stated that the couple had filed a bankruptcy petition, but did not
mention that the petition had been withdrawn and dismissed
within two months of its filing. As a result of the bankruptcy fil-
ing appearing on the report, the couple was denied a mortgage
even though they had paid off the debts that had led them to file
the petition.178 In filing suit, the plaintiff contended the report
violated the FCRA and argued the omission of the withdrawal
made the report inaccurate, incomplete and misleading.179 In de-
ciding the case, the court concluded that, although the fact that
the bankruptcy petition had been withdrawn may have made the
report more accurate, this section of the FCRA did not require
completeness and that to require an agency to independently
update information after its initial receipt and verification would
burden commercial exchange beyond legislative intent. 80
Although the burden of requiring credit bureaus to inde-
pendently review and update the credit files of millions of con-
sumers would be immense, the necessity for doing so can be
found for two distinct reasons. First, one must look to the legisla-
tive intent behind the passage of FCRA.' 8' The FCRA was cre-
ated "to protect consumers from being unjustly damaged because
of inaccurate or arbitrary information in a credit report."182 Dur-
ing Congressional debate over the passage of the FCRA, Senator
Proxmire noted that "perhaps the most serious problem in the
credit reporting industry is the problem of inaccurate or mislead-
ing information."18 3 As a result of this concern, Congress declared
177.468 F. Supp. 494 (D.Conn. 1978).
178. See id. at 495.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 497.
181. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). "The purpose of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act is to require consumer reporting agencies to adopt reasonable proce-
dures to meet the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance,
and other information in a manner that is fair to consumers." Id.
182. S. Rep. No. 91-517, at 1 (1969).
183. 115 Cong. Rec. 2441 (1969).
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that reasonable procedures would be required to assure a credit
report's "maximum accuracy." 184 As shown by the cases men-
tioned, however, the court system has typically failed to hold
credit bureaus to this lofty standard. One court did note, how-
ever, that "reports containing factually correct information that
nonetheless mislead their readers are neither maximally accurate
nor fair to the consumer who is the subject of the reports."'185
Thus, when interpreting the FCRA, the court should look at the
legislative intent of Congress which was clearly more concerned
with the rights of private consumers and their credit information
than with placing a burden on credit bureaus to assure the in-
formation they disseminate is accurate.
Second, since the courts have construed the FCRA's accu-
racy requirements somewhat liberally, credit bureaus in the past
had little incentive to correct mistakes that may have adversely
affected a consumer's credit score.186 As a result, consumers have
often been left with little remedy when problems are left uncor-
rected. For example, in 1991, the United States Public Interest
Research Group analyzed credit bureau complaints that had been
filed with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).187 The results of
this and subsequent surveys provide informative data.
Consumers who had finally taken their complaints to the
FTC had already complained to the credit bureau, without satis-
faction, for an average of twenty-three weeks. 88 In 1993, the re-
sults were no better as consumers who complained to the FTC,
had complained to the credit bureau for an average of thirty-one
weeks. 89
From 1990-1993, complaints regarding credit bureaus led
all others at the FTC, each year and for the four year period. In
fact, the FTC testified to Congress in 1991 that credit bureau
complaints were the largest, and fastest growing category in its
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1994).
185. See Koropoulos v. Credit Bur., 734 F.2d 37,40 (D.C. Cir. May, 1984).






files. 90 Sixty-one percent of the complainants had been denied
credit, housing, or jobs due to the mistakes in their reports.191
Forty-four percent of these disgruntled consumers had someone
else's negative credit on their reports.192 Sixty-four percent of the
false information found in complainants' reports belonged to to-
tal strangers while twenty-three percent belonged to relatives,
and thirteen percent belonged to ex-spouses .193
In 1994, a bill was proposed in the House of Representa-
tives that would establish increased duties on credit bureaus to
conduct re-investigations of errors and remove information that
could not be verified. 9 4 The proposal would also require that
any such re-investigation of an alleged error be completed within
thirty days, and that banks and other creditors be required to use
reasonable procedures to avoid errors.195 These proposals, how-
ever, were not passed by the 103rd Congress, and lay dormant
until resurrected and passed along with several other provisions
in September, 1996.196 Though certainly a step in the right direc-
tion, several of the amendments made to the FCRA could still be
augmented.
Those proclaiming the virtue of a stronger, amended FCRA
will quickly point to the new provision that will allow the FTC to
impose civil penalties for violations.197 Under the Act, a credit
bureau can be assessed fines up to $1000 per violation if either
they or a creditor are found to have willfully violated the
FCRA.198 Although these types of penalties may have an effect
on the diligence of credit bureaus in correcting errors, other new
additions may in fact counteract the effectiveness of the fine pro-
vision. For instance, the FCRA now permits the filing of a coun-




193. See Mierzwinski, supra note 60, at 1.
194. See H.R. 1015,103rd Cong. (1994).
195. See id.
196. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1994) (amended 1996).
197. See id. at § 1681(n) (amended 1996).
198. See id.
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lawsuit against the lender.19 9 Thus, as the Act now reads, the
credit bureau may have an incentive to maintain accurate infor-
mation or face possible fines. There may be fewer suits brought
by individual consumers, however, if they feel their cases may be
deemed frivolous, forcing everyday consumers to compensate
the credit bureau for their legal fees.200
Though the credit bureaus have indeed caused their share
of problems in conjunction with credit scoring, the lenders that
employ them are not without blame. Apart from the problems
with lenders selling customer information to third parties, prob-
lems have also arisen between lenders and credit bureaus in
situations where financial institutions intentionally withheld cer-
tain customer information. 20 1 For example, many national lend-
ers such as Citigroup and Discover Financial Services routinely
fail to report credit limit data to the three national credit bu-
reaus.20 2 These companies claim that by doing so, they prevent
other lending companies from attempting to steal their customers
away with higher limits and lower interest rates. 203 The problem
that arises, however, is that by providing information to the
credit bureaus on a selective basis, lenders are skewing any credit
scores that individuals may receive when applying for other
credit cards or loans.204 Thus, credit bureaus may now have a
legitimate claim that this action by their main customers, the
large lending institutions who continuously use their services,
has been an obstacle in the credit bureau's compliance with the
FCRA.205
This problem has become so serious that the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) has joined the Federal Trade
199. See id. at § 1681(o)(b) (amended 1996).
200. See id.
201. See Lisa Fickenscher, Credit Bureaus Move Against Lenders That Withhold In-
formation, AM. BANKER, Dec. 30, 1999, at 1.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 1. A study performed by Experian found that 35% of consumers
received lower credit scores than they deserved based on lenders withholding in-




Commission (FTC) in an investigation into the practice of infor-
mation withholding by lenders.20 6 The dilemma they have en-
countered, however, involves the wording of the FCRA in regard
to the withholding of consumer data.207 Attorneys for the lender
argue that their clients are only responsible for ensuring the in-
formation they provide to the bureaus is complete and accurate
and that since a customer's credit balance is not something that
bears on creditworthiness, the lender should be allowed to be
keep the information confidential.20 8 The government, on the
other hand, contends the word "complete" in the language
means just that, and that by denying credit bureaus information
regarding their customers' credit limits, they are denying the bor-
rower recognition for a good payment history.20 9 Regardless of
which side is indeed correct, the accuracy of credit scores in the
future will depend on how the issue is resolved. Since lenders
are those who would benefit most from an accurate scoring sys-
tem, the government's definition seems more likely to prevail ei-
ther through new legislation or a new interpretation of the FCRA.
From a consumer privacy standpoint, Congress appears to
have adequately addressed concerns regarding the use of credit
scoring information for unauthorized purposes.210 Under the
1996 amendments, consumers requesting a copy of their credit
report will notice the file will display any party who has used the
information.21' Individuals may also request their names be re-
moved from lists that credit bureaus provide to lenders for pre-
screening purposes.212 Therefore, many of the privacy problems
mentioned can be alleviated as long as consumers are made
aware of these new options.
206. See Issuers Holding Out on Credit Bureaus, CARD NEWS, June 16, 1999, avail-
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the growth of computer credit scoring is un-
deniable. Along with this newfound importance, however, has
come a multitude of concerns regarding both how credit scoring
operates and the ramifications it may have on consumers' lives.
Since technological advances in computer credit scoring models
will only continue to improve, consumers must accept that many
financial transactions in which they take part will be determined
at least in part electronically. As a tightening in governmental
regulation might suggest, however, this acceptance of computer
scoring does not have to coincide with a blind faith in the integ-
rity of those institutions that provide this information. Consum-
ers must take it upon themselves to know their rights under acts
like the FCRA which provide protection against those seeking to
use their financial data improperly. Those responsible for obtain-
ing, storing, and manipulating credit scoring information must
continue seeking methods of improving their services while
complying with current regulations.
Finally, our court system must also recognize the intent of
Congress in passing the FCRA and not interpret the Act in such a
stringent manner that the consumers the Act was designed to
protect are left without remedy. Thus, only when all these fac-
tors work in unison will a modem credit scoring system benefit
all parties involved.
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